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NOTES
Prohibition of Public Funding for Abortion
Counseling: Government Violation of
Women's Constitutional Right
of Privacy
"Those who do not have the financial resources have [a] constitu-
tional right, but a right without the ability to use it is absolutely
worthless."
I
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the right of a
woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.2 This right to
abortion arose from the constitutional right of privacy. 3 This Note will
argue (1) that a woman's right to abortion includes the right to counsel-
ing on the decision and (2) that prohibitions on the use of public funds
for abortion counseling are unconstitutional because they violate the wo-
man's right of privacy.
The Court in Roe v. Wade addressed consultation for abortion when
it stated that "the abortion decision.., is... primarily ... a medical
decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. '
Similarly, in Doe v. Bolton the Court agreed that
the medical judgment [and assistance] may be exercised in the light
of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these
factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician
the room he [or she] needs to make his [or her] best medical judg-
ment. And it is room that operates for the benefit ... of the preg-
nant woman.5
Others have asserted that abortion counseling is medically necessary
before and after an abortion.6 Poor women and minor women have addi-
1. Senator Birch Bayh (D.-Ind.), June 29, 1977, quoted in THE ALAN GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE, ABORTIONS AND THE POOR: PRIVATE MORALITY, PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 9
(1979).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 166.
5. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
6. B. SARVIS & H. RODMAN, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 55 (1973).
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tional needs for abortion counseling. Part I of this Note will discuss the
need for the constitutionally important abortion-related service of abor-
tion counseling.
Part II will examine the constitutional right of personal privacy that
was the basis for the Court's decision in Roe and will argue that Roe
protects the right to abortion counseling. In Roe the Court found the
right of privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty and restrictions upon state action.7 In Doe Justice Douglas found
the right to consultation basic to the right of privacy: "The right to seek
advice on one's health and the right to place reliance on the physician of
one's choice are basic to Fourteenth Amendment values." 8 He argued
that abortion should be treated like any other medical procedure. Only
with a compelling interest can the state impose controls over the physi-
cian-patient relationship in abortion cases. Otherwise, the state denies
the woman her liberty-her right of privacy.9
Part III will examine the Court's holding in Roe that state interests
must become compelling before they can limit the fundamental right of
personal privacy. The right of personal privacy is not absolute "and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation."10
The Court in Roe weighed the state's interests in (1) the health of the
woman and (2) potential life against the fundamental right to abortion.
The Court allowed increasing state interference with a woman's abortion
decision as the pregnancy progressed.1
Part III also will discuss asserted state interests that have allowed
public funding restrictions to limit abortions and abortion-related serv-
ices since Roe. For instance, the state interest in favoring childbirth over
abortion has persuaded the Court to uphold restrictions on public fund-
ing for abortions.12 Part III then will cite criticism of public funding
restrictions on abortion and abortion-related services as infringing on the
fundamental right defined in Roe 3 and as an impermissible exercise of
congressional spending power that "compel[s] the nonassertion of abor-
tion rights."' 4 These criticisms also apply to restrictions on public fund-
ing of abortion counseling.
7. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
8. Doe, 410 U.S. at 219-20 (Douglas, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 220.
10. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
11. Id. at 163.
12. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718
F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
13. Note, Constitutional Law-State Impediments to Abortion Funding, 34 KANSAS L.
REv. 387, 396-97 (1985).
14. Note, Harris v. McRae: Cutting Back Abortion Rights, 12 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 113, 134 (1980) (emphasis added).
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Part IV will argue that any state interest in abortion regulation can-
not justify prohibiting the use of public funds for abortion counseling.
Indeed, any state interest only supports the need for counseling. The
state's interest in the health of the woman "grows in substantiality as the
woman approaches term" 5 and becomes compelling "at approximately
the end of the first trimester."16 This important interest in the woman's
health can only further support her constitutional need for counseling on
her decision whether to have an abortion. Restricting public funding for
abortion counseling is an unconstitutional burden on the indigent wo-
man's right to decide.17
This Note will conclude that restricting public funding for abortion
counseling is a governmental violation of a woman's constitutional right
of personal privacy.
I. The Need for Abortion Counseling
Counseling is necessary to the health of the pregnant woman before
and after an abortion. Indeed, one physician "considers abortion with-
out counseling unethical and hopes that abortion without counseling will
someday be considered malpractice."1"
The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
discussed abortion counseling in conjunction with the actual abortion,
implying that consultation is tantamount to abortion itself. The Court
emphasized the physical and psychological aspects of abortion that "the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consul-
tation." 19 Harms to the woman with which the Court was concerned
included
[s]pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early preg-
nancy .... Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress ... associated with the unwanted child,
and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.20
Abortion counseling can provide the pregnant woman with information
and help her deal with her feelings "in a variety of areas: subsequent
contraceptive use; alternatives to abortion; the reasons for having an
abortion; the medical procedures of abortion; and the spiritual and
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
16, Id. at 163.
17. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1080 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
18. B. SARVIS & H. RODMAN, supra note 6, at 55.
19. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
20. Id at 153.
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mental well-being of the woman."21
Justice Douglas, concurring in Doe, described abortion "as a medi-
cal problem."'2 2 He noted that the state does not control the physician-
patient relationship in any other medical procedure.23 The Court in Doe
agreed that the decision whether to abort is a medical judgment that
should be made in light of physical and psychological health factors for
the benefit of the woman.24
The United States Supreme Court, in explicitly conjoining abortion
itself with abortion counseling by emphasizing the medical aspects of
abortion in conjunction with the physician-patient relationship, thus en-
dorsed the need for abortion counseling. Linking the need for abortion
counseling to the right to abortion creates a presumption of the need for
abortion counseling for any pregnant woman contemplating an abortion.
Some pregnant women have additional needs for counseling because of
their age or economic status.
A minor woman may have a need for abortion counseling beyond
the need to address the medical concerns for her physical and psycholog-
ical health. A minor woman's parent(s) may not be her best advisers on
family planning matters.25 The effect of leaving the responsibility for
abortion counseling to the parent(s) has been compared to the effect of
leaving general education ("reading, writing, and arithmetic" 26 ) to the
parent(s): the minor's knowledge may not be advanced.27
Another potential problem for a minor woman seeking abortion
counseling outside her home is that she may be unable to pay for repro-
ductive health services.28 Those most likely to have abortions are young,
poor, black unmarried women.29 If the woman has to ask her parents to
pay, she loses confidentiality.3 °
A pregnant woman, regardless of her age, may lack the money to
pay for an abortion or abortion-related services. This is not an insignifi-
cant problem. "[A] much larger proportion of poor women than of
nonpoor women have unwanted pregnancies," 31 both because poor wo-
men want fewer children and because poor women are more likely to
21. B. SARVIS & H. RODMAN, supra note 6, at 101-02.
22. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 220 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. Id. Further, the state chooses to fund other medical procedures. See Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
24. Id. at 192 (opinion of the Court).
25. H. RODMAN, S. LEWIS & S. GRIFFITH, THE SEXUAL RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS:
COMPETENCE, VULNERABILITY, AND PARENTAL CONTROL 129 (1984).
26. Id. at 145.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 152.
29. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at A13, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
30. H. RODMAN, S. LEWIS & S. GRIFFITH, supra note 25, at 152.
31. THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 20.
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experience contraceptive failure.32
The indigent pregnant woman contemplating an abortion faces the
physical and psychological harms faced by all pregnant women consider-
ing abortion, and more:
An unwanted child may be disruptive and destructive of the life of
any woman, but the impact is felt most by those too poor to ame-
liorate those effects. If funds for an abortion are unavailable, a
poor woman may feel that she is forced to obtain an illegal abor-
tion that poses a serious threat to her health and even her life....
If she refuses to take this risk, and undergoes the pain and danger
of state-financed pregnancy and childbirth, she may well give up all
chance of escaping the cycle of poverty. Absent day-care facilities,
she will be forced into full-time childcare for years to come; she
will be unable to work so that her family can break out of the wel-
fare system or the lowest income brackets. If she already has chil-
dren, another infant to feed and clothe may well stretch [her]
budget past the breaking point. All chance to control the direction
of her own life will have been lost.
33
The contemplation by a poor pregnant woman of such further harms
supports an even greater need for abortion counseling for her than for a
nonpoor woman.34
II. The Constitutional Right of Personal Privacy Includes the
Right to Abortion Counseling
In addition to the need for abortion counseling established in Part I,
women have a constitutional right to abortion counseling. This right de-
rives from the same personal right of privacy that forms the basis for the
right to abortion itself.
The United States Constitution does not explicitly mention a right
of privacy," but the United States Supreme Court "has never held that
... the Fourteenth Amendment protects only those rights that the Con-
stitution specifically mentions by name.' 3 6 "[T]he 'liberty' protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than
those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights."3 7 In Roe v. Wade,
the Court held that the "right of privacy [is] founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action. "38
32. Id.
33. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 458-59 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
36. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 n.1 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 153. The right of personal privacy also has been found in the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and in the "penumbras of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 152.
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The Fourteenth Amendment states, in part, "No State shall... de-
prive any person of... liberty... without due process of law....
The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
denotes [inter alia] not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children ... and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and women].40
"[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy. '41
In Roe v. Wade the Court held that the right of personal privacy
"encompass[es] a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."'42 The Court, in its "last major abortion ruling [before Web-
ster],"43 reaffirmed the constitutional right of personal privacy in the
abortion decision:
[T]he Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private
sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of
government. That promise extends to women as well as to men.
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly pri-
vate, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a wo-
man's decision-with the guidance of her physician and within the
limits specified in Roe-whether to end her pregnancy. A wo-
man's right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other
result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of the
sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.
The privacy "interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions,"45 including an abortion decision, extends to a pri-
vacy interest in abortion counseling. "[T]he constitutionally protected
abortion decision is one in which the physician is intimately involved."46
And, "[t]he right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the
physician-patient relationship . . ,.7 Thus, a woman has a right to
consultation with a physician about her abortion decision, and this right
is included in the right of privacy.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added) (overturning a statute
restricting foreign language education).
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
42. Id. at 153.
43. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (nat'l ed.).
44. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
772 (1986) (citations omitted).
45. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
46. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (discussing
physician standing to raise a woman's rights).
47. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 17:421
Winter 1990] PUBLIC FUNDING FOR ABORTION COUNSELING 427
Since Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court has inextricably linked the
implicit right of a woman to consult with a physician about her abortion
decision with the right to abortion itself.48 In Doe v. Bolton the Court
explicitly sought to protect "[t]he woman's right to receive medical care
in accordance with her physician's best judgment."4 9 In Colautti v.
Franklin 5 0 the Court endorsed Roe's emphasis on "the central role of the
physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to
have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried
out.""1 In Whalen v. Roe52 the Court noted that a patient has a right to
receive medical care and, specifically, that a pregnant woman is entitled
to rely on her doctor for advice in connection with her decision whether
to have an abortion. 3 Most recently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed "that
the full vindication of the woman's fundamental right necessarily re-
quires that her physician [be allowed to make his or her best medical
judgment]."54
A woman's right to consultation with her physician about her abor-
tion decision unquestionably is founded in the fourteenth amendment
right of privacy. Justice Douglas, concurring in Doe, cited with approval
the right "'to acquire useful knowledge' , discussed in Meyer v. Ne-
braska as a component of liberty. Justice Douglas further stated, "The
right to seek advice on one's health and the right to place reliance on the
physician of one's choice are basic to Fourteenth Amendment values." 56
In Singleton v. Wulff57 Justice Blackmun noted that "the constitutionally
protected abortion decision is* one in which the physician is intimately
involved."5 " And the Eighth Circuit sought to protect "infringement of
the woman's fourteenth amendment right to choose an abortion after re-
ceiving the medical information necessary to exercise the right known-
ingly and intelligently."59
A pregnant woman has a right to abortion counseling equal in con-
stitutional magnitude to the right to abortion itself.
48. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
49. Doe, 410 U.S. at 197.
50. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
51. Id. at 387.
52. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
53. Id. at 604-05 n.33.
54. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1079 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
55. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 214 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
56. Id. at 219-20.
57. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
58. Id. at 117 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (emphasis added).
59. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1079.
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III. Restrictions on the Right to Abortion
A. Right of Privacy in Roe v. Wade
The right of personal privacy that includes the abortion decision is
not absolute.6 0 The right "must be considered against important state
interests in regulation."61 "[A] State may properly assert important in-
terests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in
protecting potential life."62
The United States Supreme Court has imposed a strict standard on
interference with the right of personal privacy. "Where certain 'funda-
mental rights' [like privacy] are involved, the Court has held that regula-
tion limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest' .... 63 "At some point in pregnancy, [the state] interests be-
come sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that gov-
ern the abortion decision." 64
In Roe v. Wade the Court identified the state interests in the abor-
tion decision as (1) the state "interest in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman,"' 65 and (2) the state "interest in protecting
the potentiality of human life.",6 6 "These interests are separate and dis-
tinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and,
at a point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.' "267
The Court found the first state interest in the health of the pregnant
woman compelling "at approximately the end of the first trimester. '68
State regulation of abortion to protect the health of the pregnant woman
is not necessary before the end of the first trimester because during that
period "mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal child-
birth."69 After the first trimester, "a State may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the pres-
ervation and protection of maternal health." 70
Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are require-
ments as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the
abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in
which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be
a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospi-
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 154.
65. Id. at 162.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 162-63.
68. Id. at 163.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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tal status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like."1
Prior to the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision is "free of
interference by the State."72 "[T]he attending physician, in consultation
with his [or her] patient, is free to determine [whether] the patient's preg-
nancy should be terminated." 3
The Court found the second state interest, that in protecting poten-
tial human life, compelling at viability.74 "This is so because the fetus
then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb."75 From viability on, the state may proscribe abortion
"except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother."76 Thus, the state may increasingly restrict the right to abortion
as the pregnancy progresses, so long as any restrictions are consistent
with recognized state interests.7
B. Abortion Restrictions not Involving Funding
The compelling state interest recognized in Roe v. Wade as neces-
sary to restrict the fundamental right to abortion has left the states with
"few means of control over abortion" apart from funding.7 8 Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth 79 held unconstitutional spousal and parental con-
sent requirements before abortion. Adhering to the Roe standard, the
Court in Danforth said, "[S]ince the State cannot regulate or proscribe
abortion during the first [trimester] ... , the State cannot delegate au-
thority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion
during the same period."8" As to parental consent, the Court similarly
held, "Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse ... the
State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party [the
parent] an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his [or her] patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy
"81
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health2 held unconstitu-
tional a hospitalization requirement for second trimester abortions. The
Court reaffirmed Roe's holding that "a State's interest in health regula-
tion becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first trimes-
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 163-64.
77. Id. at 165.
78. Note, supra note 13, at 397.
79. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
80. Id. at 69.
81. Id. at 74.
82. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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ter.""3 But, the Court continued, "[A] compelling state interest in health
.. is only the beginning of the inquiry. The State's regulation may be
upheld only if it is reasonably designed to further that state interest."284
Since the hospitalization requirement "imposed a heavy, and unneces-
sary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise ac-
cessible, and safe abortion procedure [, it] therefore unreasonably
infringe[d] upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion."85
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth the Court did allow a require-
ment that the woman give her written consent prior to an abortion.86
The Court conceded that "Roe clearly establish[ed] that the State may
not restrict the decision of the patient and her physician regarding abor-
tion during the first [trimester] of pregnancy."'8 7 But, "[the decision to
abort.., is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and
imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and conse-
quences."8 As the Court "could not say that a requirement imposed by
the State that a prior written consent for any surgery would be unconsti-
tutional,"8" it found such a requirement before an abortion
constitutional.90
C. Restrictions on Abortion Funding
In contrast to the other abortion cases, the Supreme Court abortion
cases involving funding have allowed significant restrictions on abortions.
In Maher v. Roe91 the Court held that the Constitution does not require a
state that pays for childbirth to pay for nontherapeutic abortions.9 2 In
Harris v. McRae93 the Court held that denying public funding for medi-
cally necessary abortions is not unconstitutional. 94
1. Maher v. Roe
In Maher the Court discussed the district court's reading of Roe v.
Wade that the fundamental right to abortion required a compelling state
interest to justify different treatment of abortion and childbirth.95 The
Court concluded that the regulation at issue did not impinge upon the
83. Id. at 434.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 438-39.
86. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976).
87. Id. at 66.
88. Id. at 67.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
92. Id. at 465-66, 479.
93. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
94. Id. at 326-27.
95. Maher, 432 U.S. at 471.
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fundamental right defined in Roe because, though the regulation may
have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, an indigent pregnant
woman could still obtain an abortion through private services.9 6 The
Court saw its opinion in Maher as "no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it."97 The Court held, "There is a basic difference between di-
rect state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."98
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Maher, disagreed with the majority's
holding that the regulation did not impinge upon the fundamental right
to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade. He wrote:
Roe v. Wade and cases following it hold that an area of privacy
invulnerable to the State's intrusion surrounds the decision of a
pregnant woman whether or not to carry her pregnancy to term.
The [regulation at issue] clearly impinges upon that area of privacy
by bringing financial pressures on indigent women that force them
to bear children they would not otherwise have. That is an obvi-
ous inpairment of the fundamental right established by Roe v.
Wade.
Justice Brennan noted that the Court had "repeatedly found that in-
fringements of fundamental rights are not limited to outright denials of
these rights."" "The fact that the [regulation at issue] may not operate
as an absolute bar preventing all indigent women from having abortions
is not critical. What is critical is that the State has inhibited their funda-
mental right to make that choice free from state interference."'10 1 Be-
cause the state demonstrated no compelling interest to justify interfering
with a woman's choice, Justice Brennan found pregnant women's funda-
mental right "'unduly' burdened."' 2
2. Harris v. McRae
In Harris v. McRae 101 the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that denying public funding for medically necessary abortions affects the
significant interest of a pregnant woman in protecting her health during
pregnancy, which "lies at the core of the personal constitutional freedom
recognized in Wade."'" The Court did acknowledge that
[b]ecause even the compelling interest of the State in protecting
potential life after fetal viability was held to be insufficient to out-
weigh a woman's decision to protect her life or health, it could be
96. Id. at 474.
97. Id. at 475.
98. Id.
99. Id at 484-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 487.
101. Id. at 488.
102. Id. at 489 (citation omitted).
103. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
104. Id. at 315.
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argued that the freedom of a woman to decide whether to termi-
nate her pregnancy for health reasons does in fact lie at the core of
the constitutional liberty identified in Wade."'5
The Court decided, however, that even if a woman's freedom of choice to
terminate her pregnancy for health reasons were at the core of Roe's due
process liberty, that freedom did not "carr[y] with it a constitutional en-
titlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of
protected choices." 10 6 The Court reasoned as it had in Maher: The state
may not interfere with an indigent woman's constitutional freedom of
choice, but the state "need not remove [obstacles to a woman's exercise
of her freedom of choice] not of its own creation."' 1 7 The Court left to
Congress the determination whether constitutionally protected freedom
of choice warrants federal subsidization. 108
Justice Brennan wrote a strong dissent in Harris. He argued that
the Court had mischaracterized the nature of the fundamental right de-
fined in Roe and misconceived the manner in which restricting funding
for medically necessary abortions infringes that right. 9 Since the preg-
nant woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion must be free
of state interference (at least through the first trimester), the state cannot
exercise its power and influence to burden her constitutional right.' 10
Justice Brennan further argued that excluding medically necessary
abortions from public funding coverage "cannot be justified as a cost-
saving device":1 "[T]he cost of an abortion is only a small fraction of
the costs associated with childbirth."" 2 By choosing to pay only for
childbirth, however, the state "inject[s] coercive financial incentives...
into a decision that is constitutionally guaranteed to be free from govern-
ment intrusion [and] deprives the indigent woman of her freedom to
choose abortion over maternity, thereby impinging on the due process
liberty recognized in Roe v. Wade. 113
Justice Brennan dismissed the Court's argument that the woman's
indigency alone, not state action, interferes with her freedom of choice:
The combination of the woman's poverty and the state's unequal funding
of abortion and childbirth interferes with her constitutional right." 4
Since the Court had "never hesitated to invalidate any scheme of grant-
ing or withholding financial benefits that incidentally or intentionally
105. Id. at 316.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 318.
109. Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 330.
Ill. Id. at 331.
112. Id. at 355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
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burdens one manner of exercising a constitutionally protected choice,"
115
Justice Brennan found such interference with a fundamental right
unconstitutional. 1 1
6
D. Criticism of Restrictions on Abortion Funding
In addition to the forceful dissents in Maher and Harris, criticism of
these cases has included commentary characterizing the decisions as in-
fringing upon a woman's constitutional fundamental right of personal
privacy to choose whether to have an abortion. Professor Laurence H.
Tribe has addressed the argument that the government does not have an
affirmative duty to meet an individual's constitutional rights.1 7 He notes
that most constitutional rights are (1) individual, (2) alienable, and (3)
negative, that is, such rights (1) belong to individuals, (2) can be waived,
and (3) "impose on government only a duty to refrain from certain inju-
rious actions, rather than an affirmative obligation to direct energy or
resources to meet another's needs." 11 Funding the constitutional right
of abortion would be an example of such an affirmative governmental
duty. Professor Tribe notes, however, that some constitutional rights
may entail affirmative state protection. Two examples of such rights are
the sixth amendment guarantee of "Assistance of Counsel" 119 for crimi-
nal defense'20 and the thirteenth amendment 121 prohibition of slavery.' 22
Indeed, Professor Tribe finds a "strong parallel between a woman's right
not to remain pregnant and every person's inalienable right not to be
enslaved."' 23 Since the state can choose to fund abortions, its decision
not to do so acts to alienate an indigent pregnant woman from her consti-
tutional right.'24 "Such governmental choices... require women to sac-
rifice their liberty .... 125
Another commentator has argued that both the regulation at issue
in Maher and the legislation at issue in Harris likely are unconstitutional
because they cover first trimester abortions.' 26 According to Roe, first
trimester abortions should be free of any state interference.' 27 The Court
in Maher did not require a compelling state interest test because it saw
115. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 334-36.
117. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and
the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 330 (1985).
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
120. Tribe, supra note 117, at 334.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
122. Tribe, supra note 117, at 335.
123. Id. at 337.
124. Id. at 336.
125. Id. at 337.
126. Note, supra note 13, at 406.
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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the regulation at issue as merely favoring childbirth, not interfering with
an indigent pregnant woman's right to choose whether to have an abor-
tion.'28 The Court relied on its Maher reasoning in Harris.29 This argu-
ment emphasizes Justice Brennan's point in his Harris dissent that the
right to choose an abortion must be free of state interference, at least
through the first trimester. 30 Given such an obvious reading and appli-
cation of Roe v. Wade, criticisms of the holdings in Maher and Harris are
apparent, at least for abortions in the first trimester, even without reach-
ing Professor Tribe's affirmative duty thesis.' Apart from any showing
of a compelling state interest, restrictions on public funding of abortions
"actively discourageD abortion."' 32 Arguably, such an "affirmative 'ob-
stacle' . . . impinge[s] upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe v.
wade,,33
A critic of Harris v. McRae characterizes the opinion as "inconsis-
tent with the substantive due process rationale articulated in Roe v.
Wade,"' 34 both as serving no compelling state interest "other than com-
pelling the nonassertion of a constitutional right,"' 35 and as violating the
indigent pregnant woman's right of privacy by imposing financial pres-
sures on her.1 36 A state interest in efficiently designing a public health
care program could not justify the legislation at issue in Harris, argues
this writer, because the cost of an abortion is much less than the costs
associated with childbirth. 37 The only state interest served by the regu-
lation was to prevent indigent pregnant women from having abortions. 38
Such a barrier to abortion clearly violates Roe v. Wade.139
This critic also addresses whether an "indigent [pregnant] woman's
claim to a public dollar [is] necessarily better and stronger than that of
numerous other claimants on the treasury." 'I Not all forms of constitu-
tionally protected behavior are entitled to the same amount of subsidiza-
tion.' Nevertheless, when the government establishes a benefit
program for pregnant women, and through that program makes abortion
128. Id. at 394.
129. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
132. Note, supra note 13, at 396 (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 396-97 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
134. Note, supra note 14, at 116.
135. Id. at 134.
136. Id. at 122.
137. Id. at 134-35. The legislation at issue in Harris did not restrict state funding of child-
birth. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
138. Note, supra note 14, at 135.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 120.
141. Id. at 123. "[The] government may not prohibit private education, but it may support
its own public schools without thereby obligating itself to subsidize private schools as well."
Id. at 122-23.
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impossible for indigent pregnant women, it violates the constitutional
right of personal privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade. 42
E. Sunmmary of Restrictions on the Right to Abortion
In the abortion cases addressing restrictions not related to funding,
the United States Supreme Court has upheld as a permissible restriction
on abortion only the requirement that the woman give her written con-
sent prior to an abortion. '43 In the abortion funding cases, the Court has
allowed significant restrictions on a woman's constitutional right, 44 but
these restrictions have been strongly criticized as infringement of the fun-
damental right of personal privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade without
the required showing of a compelling state interest. 145
IV. No Justification Exists for Allowing Restrictions on Public
Funding for Abortion Counseling
As discussed in Part II of this Note, the Roe v. Wade right to abor-
tion includes the right to abortion counseling. As discussed in Part III,
only a compelling state interest can restrict that right. As this Part will
demonstrate, every state interest found in abortion cases argues for coun-
seling. The criticisms of the Supreme Court decisions allowing restric-
tions on public funding for abortion itself therefore apply with even
greater force to restrictions on public funding of abortion counseling.
The policy reason behind the written consent requirement146 sup-
ports counseling. That reason, as the Court expressed, was a concern
that the abortion decision be made "with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences."' 47 This reason argues equally for the state's interest that
a woman receive counseling prior to an abortion.
An even more forceful argument for funding of abortion counseling
arises from the Roe v. Wade trimester approach. Because first trimester
142. Id. at 130. Arguably, according to this analysis, if the state chose not to fund abortion
or childbirth, it would not violate Roe. Id. at 125 (agreeing with Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) that because abortions that were not medically necessary were treated no differently
than other nontherapeutic medical procedures, the regulation at issue was not unconstitu-
tional, thus distinguishing Maher from Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and criticizing
the Court's use of its Maher reasoning in Harris). Professor Tribe argues further, though, that
because abortion is a constitutional right requiring state funding for indigent pregnant women
who choose to have an abortion, the state has an affirmative duty to fund such abortions. See
supra note 124 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 91-98, 103-108 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 99-102, 109-142 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
147. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 86-90 (further explaining Danforth).
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abortions are "free of interference by the State,"1 48 and because, as dis-
cussed in Part II of this Note, the fundamental right to abortion includes
a fundamental right to abortion counseling, the state simply cannot re-
strict abortion counseling in the first trimester.
After the first trimester, the state has a compelling interest in the
pregnant woman's health.1 49 This interest supports, a fortiori, the need
for abortion counseling discussed in Part I. To "regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health ' 150 can
offer no justification for restricting abortion counseling. Any state inter-
est, especially a compelling state interest in the pregnant woman's health,
only supports abortion counseling.
The Court's decisions, like Maher and Harris, that the state may
constitutionally restrict funding for an abortion itself do not support re-
strictions on public funding for abortion counseling as constitutional:
"The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that states cannot consti-
tutionally impose ... burdensome obstacles to what is at bottom a right
to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy."'' Finally, the criticisms of
the Court's abortion funding decisions, arguing that the decisions actu-
ally are unconstitutional because they demonstrate no compelling state
interest to justify restricting abortion, present even more forceful argu-
ments against the constitutionality of prohibitions of public funding for
abortion counseling. Prohibiting public funding for abortion counseling
"is an unacceptable infringement of the woman's fourteenth amendment
right to choose an abortion after receiving the medical information neces-
sary to exercise the right knowingly and intelligently."' 152
The socially and medically necessary abortion-related service of
abortion counseling, as discussed in Part I, is a fundamental constitu-
tional right. As discussed in Part II, that right is grounded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's personal right of privacy. As discussed in Part III,
any restriction on the fundamental rights of abortion or abortion coun-
seling must be justified by a compelling state interest in maternal health
after the first trimester. As also discussed in Part III, the Supreme
Court decisions allowing abortion funding restrictions have been criti-
cized as not meeting Roe's compelling state interest test. On the con-
trary, any state interest in maternal health argues only for abortion
counseling. Viewing abortion counseling as the right of a woman to de-
148. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 164 (emphasis added). "The existence of a compelling state interest in health
... is only the beginning of the inquiry. The state's regulation may be upheld only if it is
reasonably designed to further that state interest." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983) (emphasis added).
151. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1080 (Sth Cir. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 1079 (emphasis added).
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cide whether to terminate her pregnancy disallows any burden on this
right. The criticisms of the abortion funding cases offer further support
that restricting public funding of abortion counseling is governmental vi-
olation of a woman's constitutional right of privacy.
Conclusion
Janet Benshoof, director of Reproductive Freedom Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union, has said, "'[The right to abortion] is the
only constitutional right that the Government has ever asked to have
taken away.' "5,,3 "For years, anti-abortion groups have chipped away at
Roe v. Wade, working to cut off state financing of abortions for poor
women ...... 154
If Roe v. Wade were overturned, each state could restrict abortion as
it chose. 155 The president of the Fund for the Feminist Majority, Elea-
nor Smeal, has predicted that "'every state will become a civil war bat-
tleground' on the abortion issue if the Court overrules Roe, v. Wade
.... 156 Janet Benshoof is confident, however, that "the Court will be
very reluctant to tamper with so fundamental a right as privacy .... 157
Before the Court decided Webster, The New York Times, anticipat-
ing a Court ruling on the constitutionality of prohibiting public funding
for abortion counseling, stated that "banning Federal funds to clinics
that offer abortion counseling [would result in the suffering of] four mil-
lion mostly poor women who rely on federally supported family planning
clinics . . . ."I' As this Note has demonstrated, the right to abortion
counseling is constitutionally protected. No justification exists for re-
stricting this right by governmental restriction of public funding for
abortion counseling.
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